In August of 1964, an event occurred off the waters of North Vietnam that would have repercussions that would echo in US foreign policy for decades. Two alleged confrontations between US Navy vessels and North Vietnamese ships set off a chain of events that resulted in a dramatic escalation in the United States involvement in Vietnam, and a subsequent backlash that would change military policy to the present day. Learn more about the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the event that began the large-scale US military presence in Vietnam on this episode of Everything Everywhere Daily. Hey, everyone. This is Gary. If you're listening to this podcast, you clearly are someone who likes to learn every day. And if you want to add a little more learning into your everyday routine, check out Ted Talks Daily, the podcast that brings you a new Ted Talk every weekday. In less than 15 minutes a day, you'll hear about some of the big ideas shaping our world. This includes everything from artificial intelligence to the search for dark matter and more. Listen to Ted Talks Daily wherever you get your podcast.

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The Vietnam War is a nuanced and complicated subject. The story really begins several centuries ago when France colonized parts of Southeast Asia, which they called Indochina. The fight for Independence by the Vietnamese had been going on for decades, but began in earnest after the end of the Second World War. Communist forces led by Ho Chi Min managed to take over the northern part of the country in 1945, and in 1954, the North Vietnamese delivered a crushing blow to the French at the Battle of Dien Ben Phu. The United States involvement in the region began small with the support of the creation of the nation of South Vietnam in 1955. The United States provided economic and military aid, but was not yet a major regional player. Under President John F. Kennedy, the United States increased US military support and sent a limited number of military advisors to South Vietnam. The United States, via the Central Intelligence Agency, eventually was behind a military coup in the assassination of President at No Den Ziem in 1963. From 1960 to 1964, the number of US military advisors in Vietnam increased steadily. There were 900 advisors deployed in 1960, which had grown to 24,000 by 1964.

That was a large increase, but it was nothing compared to what would happen over the next several years. The causes of the Vietnam War and the beginnings of American involvement will be addressed in future episodes of this podcast. But in this episode, I I want to address the event that changed the United States role from advisors to active combatants, the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In hindsight, the Gulf of Tonkin incident seems like a rather minor affair. There have been much bigger incidents between the United States and other countries that did not result in a full-scale war. The Gulf of Tonkin incident was really two separate incidents. Sort of. That '' part turned into one of the biggest controversies in the history of US foreign policy. The Gulf of Tonkin is the sea between North Vietnam and China's Hainan Island. The United States Navy had a presence in the Gulf of Tonkin, performing signal intelligence off the Coast of North Vietnam. These intelligence missions were known as de Soto Patrols, an acronym that stood for D-Haven Special Operations off Singtaou. The D-Haven was the ship that originally started the operations, and Singtaou is in Northern China, where the signal intelligence originally took place.

On August Back in 1964, the American destroyer, USS Maddox, was on a de Soto mission in the Gulf of Tonkin, gathering signal intelligence from North Vietnam. While on patrol, approximately 28 miles off the shore in international waters, the Maddox encountered three North Vietnamese torpedo boats, each carrying two torpedoes with high explosive warheads. The torpedo boats began approaching the Maddox at high speeds. The Maddox fired warning shots, and the North Vietnamese boats responded with machine gun fire. The North Vietnamese boats maneuvered to get into position to fire their torpedoes. Two of the boats fired both of their torpedoes, but they were well outside of their effective range of 1,000 yards. The Maddox called for assistance, and aircraft from the USS Thai Khaja Roga intercepted the North Vietnamese boats. In the ensuing fight, all three of the North Vietnamese boats were damaged and four North Vietnamese sailors were killed. On the American side, no one was killed and no one was injured. One aircraft was slightly damaged, and there was one bullet that hit the Maddox. The Maddox then withdrawn and continued its patrol with another ship, the USS Turner Joy. The events of August second are fairly well agreed upon, and there isn't much controversy surrounding what happened.

There were plenty of witnesses and evidence from both sides. In the big scheme of things, this whole incident really wasn't that big of a deal, at least on the American side. There were no casualties, and the damage was very minor. However, I He mentioned before that the Gulf of Tonken incident actually involved two different incidents. The second incident, which caused the most controversy, took place two days later on August fourth. The Maddox and the Turner Joy were once again on patrol, with crews on very high alert following the events that happened two days earlier. President Lyndon Johnson ordered the ships back on patrol in a show of American resolve. That morning, US intelligence received reports that the North Vietnamese might conduct offensive operations in response to what happened on August second, and also because of attacks by South Vietnam on August third. August fourth saw poor weather with rough seas and storms. Waves were up to 6 feet or 2 meters high with very little visibility. In addition, the Maddox's long-range air search radar and the Turnerjoy's fire control radar were both not working. Given the intelligence of that day, the Maddox and the Turnerjoy were both ordered further back out to sea to give them more room to maneuver.

In the evening, they were about 100 miles from the Coast of North Vietnam. Around 8:40 PM, the Maddox began getting strange signals. They reported sonar readings of multiple targets that were incoming seemingly from all directions. Some of the targets had the signature of torpedoes, but then they would disappear. Both destroyers took evasive action and fired at the targets. Collectively, they fired 249 five-inch shells, 123 three-inch shells, and dropped four or five depth charges. The Maddox and Turner Joy both radioed that they were under attack. Despite all of the activity, there were no visual sightings of any ships or any torpedoes. Word of the attack was sent to Washington, and it was relayed to the President. That evening, on August fourth, in Washington, on the other side of the world, President Johnson made a television address to the American people. He told the American people of the attack and requested authority from Congress respond militarily. Congress acted quickly. On August seventh, both Houses of Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which gave the President the ability to unilaterally use conventional military force in Southeast Asia without a Declaration operation of war or further approval of Congress.

On August 10th, it was enacted into law. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was perhaps the single biggest increase in presidential power with regards to military matters since the ratification of the Constitution. With the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, US military involvement in Vietnam expanded rapidly. The 23,000 US troops in Vietnam in 1964 expanded to a high of over 536 6,000 by 1968. The events I've just described to you so far is what the American people and most members of Congress were told back in 1964. However, there is more to the story. Things which were known almost immediately on August fourth, 1964, that were never released to the public until years later. Basically, there was no attack on August 4. There was never any evidence that an attack took place, and this error was known almost immediately. The Commander of the Maddox, Captain John Herrick, sent a notification soon after they thought they were under attack, which said, Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft. It was eventually concluded that the sonar sounds that were heard were actually the sounds of the propeller when the ship turned suddenly.

And the radar signatures that kept coming and going were picking up the tops of waves. A single aircraft was sent from the USS Taekong N'Aroga to survey the site where the Maddox and Turner Joy were supposedly attacked. The plane was flown by then Commander writer, James Stockdale. And just as an aside, Stockdale later became the highest-ranking naval officer to be held as a prisoner of war, serving seven years in a Vietnamese prison. He was later awarded the Medal of Honor and promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral. He was also the vice presidential candidate on the ticket with Ross Perot in 1992. Stockdale later reported what he saw when he flew over to investigate. He said, I had the best seating the house to watch that event, and our destroyers were just shooting at phantom targets. There were no PT boats there. There was nothing but black water and American firepower. On the evening of August fourth, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamera, did receive the reports that there may not have been an attack after all. Also on the evening of August fourth, one of the analysts on duty in the Pentagon, who ironically was there for his first day of work that received the communiques from the Maddox, was Daniel Ellsberg.

Daniel Ellsberg was the same person who leaked the Confidential Pentagon papers in 1971. The document that he leaked was actually titled, The History of US Decision-Making in Vietnam, 1945 to 1968, which Ellsberg had helped write while working with the RAN Corporation. The Pentagon papers exposed the fact that the Johnson administration had manipulated the events surrounding the Gulf of Tonken incident to justify increased military intervention in Vietnam. The paper showed that the second attack on August 4, 1964, likely did not occur, and yet it was used to rally support for the Gulf of Tonken resolution. Years after the war, in 1995, the former Secretary of Defense under Johnson at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Robert McNamera, visited Vietnam. There, he met with the Minister of Defense of North Vietnam at the time, Vo Nuen Gap. During their meeting, McNamera bluntly asked him what happened on August 4, 1964, and Gap responded, Absolutely nothing. In the 2003 documentary about Robert McNamera, The Fog of War, a movie I highly recommend, McNamera on camera admits that the entire August fourth attack never happened. Finally, in 2001, a report issued by Robert J. Haneiak, a historian for the National Security Agency, concluded that the NSA had distorted information about the Gulf of Tonken.

In his report, he said, As much as anything else, it was an awareness that Johnson would brook no uncertainty that could undermine his position. Faced with this attitude, CIA agent Ray Klein was quoted as saying, We knew it was bum dope that we were getting from the seventh Fleet, but we were told only to give fact with no elaboration on the nature of the evidence. Everyone knew how volatile LBJ was. He did not like to deal with uncertainties. After the release of the Pentagon papers and after knowledge about the truth of what happened in the Gulf of Tonken became widely known, it evoked a reaction by Congress. In 1973, Congress passed the War Power Act, which took away many of the powers given to the President in the Gulf of Tonken Resolution in 1964. The key stipulations of the War Power Act are that the President must notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action, and that US forces cannot remain engaged in hostilities for more than 60 days, with a further 30-day withdrawal period without a Congressional authorisation for use of military force or a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, from a military standpoint, was not a major affair.

Compared to what would come later in the war, it was one of the most insignificant actions of the war. Nonetheless, it turned out to be an incredibly significant event and one of the most important of the Cold War, simply because of what it brought about. It was responsible for the passage of the Gulf of Tonken Resolution, which paved the way for the wide-scale American escalation of the Vietnam War. The executive producer of Everything Everywhere Daily is Charles Daniel. The associate producers are Ben Long and Cameron Kiefer. Today's review comes from listener, Dorth Vader, over on Apple Podcasts in the United States. They write, Best podcast ever. Great show. I especially like the war operation and kidnapping episodes, and hope to see more of these episodes in the future. Well, thank you, Dharth Vaider. It's always nice to see some of the Sith lords enjoying the show. And if you like war operations and kidnapping episodes, I think I can read between the lines to figure out what you really want. An episode about Order 66. Remember, if you leave a review or send me a boostagram, you two can have it read on the show.

My fellow Americans, as President and Commander-in-Chief, it is my duty to the American people to Report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas and the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply. The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox on August second was repeated today by another another.