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Ie. Welcome to the PDP Situation Report. I'm Mike Baker, your eyes and ears on the world's stage. All right, let's get briefed. Ukraine's push into Russia's Kursk region has entered its third week, with Kyiv's forces solidifying and expanding their foothold. But while progress is being made across the border, the situation on Ukrainian soil, well, it tells a different story. We'll break down the latest developments and what they mean for the conflict with George Buros from the Institute for the Study of War. Later in the show, we'll shift our focus to the toll that the Russian-Ukraine conflict is taking on the Russian people. Here, obviously, I don't mean Putin and his cronies, his minions. I could care less about any toll on them. In fact, I hope it's a fairly sizable toll on them. I'm talking about the Russian population that's suffering in many ways from Putin's military adventurism. The soldiers and conscripts regularly tossed into the meat grinder, and the people at home dealing with a worsening economy and the impact of sanctions. Beyond the battlefield losses, Russia is grappling with sanctions that have frankly upended daily life. For a closer look at how these pressures are reshaping society, we'll be joined by Konstantin Smoylyov, He's a Russian expat and host of the popular YouTube channel Inside Russia.

He's got some really interesting insight. But first, the Situation Report Spotlight. Kyiv's surprise incursion into Kershk on August sixth has dramatically altered the landscape of the conflict. Now, as of this week, Ukrainian forces have reportedly seized control of approximately 500 square miles of Russian territory, give or take 10 or 20 miles, including approximately 92 settlements. Now, this unexpected advance has placed significant pressure on the Kremlin, with Russian President Putin working overtime to deflect blame for the situation. It's certainly not the fault of the fellow who led the invasion. No, it wouldn't be that. In a video conference with Russian politicians, including the governors of Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk regions, Putin stated that the, security issues in Kursk were, problems that are the responsibility of the security forces. Now, while Russia Russia faces setbacks in Kursk, it's not without gains on other fronts. This is important to understand and to remember. On the battlefield in Ukraine, Russian forces have reported capturing the small town of New York in Eastern Ukraine, marking a step forward in their push towards major population centers in the Donetsk region. Okay, for more on the accursion into Kursk, let me bring in George Buros.

Now, he's the Russia team lead at the Institute for the Study of War. George, thank Thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation Report. Really appreciate it.

Thanks so much for having me again, Mike. It's good to see you.

Thank you. Likewise. Good to see you. Now, let's, I guess, start from the beginning. I don't know that when it comes When it comes to Ukrainian military flipping the tables on Putin and making their march on Russian territory, I don't know that anybody really had that on their 2024 Bingo cards. Let's start from that point. To what degree was that incursion into Russian territory expected? And more importantly, from your perspective, what does it mean? What's the overall objective?

Yeah, absolutely. It was a partial surprise. In terms of the geography to go into Russia itself, that was unexpected. However, in terms of the timing, we actually were forecasting that the Ukrainian lines would have solidified a little bit better by late 2024, 2025. We published a report back in mid 2024 that the Ukrainians would likely be in in a better position, and they might even conduct some limited operations, offensive operations in late '24, early 2025. The timing tracks, but the geography is unique and different, and that's interesting, I think. I don't want to speculate on the Ukrainian's objective because no one really knows unless you're in the Ukrainian high command. They didn't tell Washington about this operation ahead of time either. But the campaign is causing a series of dilemmas for the Kremlin. I think we can have a very interesting debate or series of questions to ask what is the primary objective, what's the secondary or tertiary one? But there's a series of effects that are being created by this offensive, and I'll briefly lay out what those are. Number one, this offensive is drastically challenging Putin's strategic planning assumptions about what it takes to wage a protractive war against Ukraine.

If you look at the map, the international border between the north-eastern part Ukraine and Russia, there's about a thousand kilometers of territory there. We know that over the last two and a half years, Putin has made a decision to not defend that international border. He has availed himself to Western policies that assumed that the Western states would not allow Ukraine to go in the offensive and use Western-provided kit in or against Russia, and Putin, therefore, did not adequately protect the border regions. Now, with this protracted Ukraine an incursion, this is going to force a decision point on the Kremlin. Will Putin, moving forward, actually invest substantial resources, including deploying several divisions, tens of thousands of Russian soldiers that will now have to cover an additional thousand kilometers of border in the theater, or will Putin not? If he chooses to actually invest in defending the border, then that drastically increases the resourcing requirements indefinitely to actually be able to protract to fight the war, and that will decrease the resources available to actually fight the war inside of occupied Ukraine. Even if the Russians swing around, eventually push the Ukrainians out, if they do indeed cover that additional border, that would be a win in my book for the Ukrainians.

Other effects that this is generating for the Ukrainians, which are good. This is gumming up the entire Russian high operational and strategic level planning for the whole campaign. We know that the Russians, over the last eight, nine months, they've been the beneficiaries of having the initiative across the entire theater. That is, they get to choose when, where, the tempo of operations, and essentially how to serve up in different parts of the theater a bunch of dilemmas for the Ukrainians or how to respond. Now with the Ukrainians flipping the script, the Russians are on the backfoot in at least the north, and now the Russians are stripping parts of the line, not everywhere, but parts of the line, and redeploying units to go respond to Kershk. I think it's a little too early to see exactly how that's going to affect the tempo of operations. As you noted at the introduction, the Russians are actually doubling down on their offensive efforts in the East. But this is substantial, and it's changing the way that the Russians wanted to fight this war. Finally, it's a political dilemma for Putin. Putin spent the last two decades trying to rebuild the prestige of Russia, present Russia as a country of stability, of recovery, of resurging geopolitical pre-eminence.

I think Putin has chosen a response to this the incursion was very interesting. He channeled a little bit of his inner Stalin. He did not respond for three or four days after the incursion began. He, very interestingly, did not use this as an opportunity to declare war against Ukraine or to declare martial law. He didn't even create a military headquarters to deal with this invasion. He instead said, This is going to be a counterterrorist operation that the Russian domestic police, the Russian Federal Security Service, the FSB, are going to handle. Now, with this FSB headquarters that he's standing up, it has to deal with a variety of different security agencies and military units and try to cobble together what looks to be a very unorthodox and very sketchy joint headquarters, which I'm personally skeptical of its ability to effectively deal with the first time that a mechanized combined arms force has operated Russian soil since the 1940s.

Why do you think he's reacted the way he did? Because oftentimes, Putin loves nothing more than to have a bogeyman. To point and to whip up the Nationalist frenzy and say we're being attacked from the outside. It's all whoever, the US's fault, the EU's fault. Why is he having this limited, I don't know if that's the right word for it, response and not beating the drum more in terms of saying, We're at war. Look at this. They're invading us.

I was expecting Putin to use this as the opportunity to say, My fellow Russians, this is the time that I've been warning you about for decades. This is the NATO-backed effort to, like Napoleon did and the Germans did in World War II, to dismantle the Russian Federation, and now we must defend the motherland, but he didn't. I think it's actually because the popular myth about Putin being the master of the tactical mastermind and the shrewd gambler, I think those are not true. In fact, we have a lot of counter factual evidence over the last two and a half years of war that demonstrates that at the strategic level, Putin is very, very calculating, but he's extremely cautious, and he's unwilling to actually undertake risky decisions that are going to risk his political stability, domestic stability at home. Russian leaders, they typically change either due to Powell's coups or due to large scale revolution from the ground up. Putin is very comfortable, I think, about his Powell situation. He shored that up with removing Yukini Prigozhin, actually on this day last year. However, he doesn't He doesn't want to call general war. He doesn't want to conduct general mobilization.

In his response to this incursion, he didn't dignify the Ukrainian brigades rolling around in Russia as regular, legitimate military combatants. He said that they were terrorists. We are going to conduct a counter terrorist operation. It seems like in his effort to try to downplay the severity and the embarrassment and his mistakes and not adequately protecting the border, he's trying to essentially do damage control, a message to the Russians, population, not to worry. This isn't as embarrassing as it is. It's not a big deal. It's just a minor border incursion. The local police are going to take care of it. And interestingly, he did not signal that he wants to conduct a new wave of mobilization. He, in fact, said that the number of volunteer recruits who have come forward to participate in this counter operation and answer the call of duty is very high. And that's his tacit way of communicating to the Russian people, I'm not interested in. Don't worry, I'm not going to violate another aspect of our social contract. I'm not going to call a mobilization.

I think he's getting a lot of pushback, if I'm not mistaken. I think he's getting a lot of pushback from a variety of elements, including probably a variety of oligarchs, businessmen, who see what the war has done to the economy inside Russia, and even just something as straightforward as labor shortages to members of the Kremlin, I think, who think a mobilization is a terrible idea. He may actually be taking their advice at this point. Talking about internally within Russia, depending on who you believe, maybe upwards of 200,000 residents in that area had been evacuated. Now, obviously, they're aware of what's going on. But to what degree do we know about what the rest of the country is thinking or is even aware of in terms of what's happening in Kursk? Yeah.

I think the Russian state media has done a very masterful job of controlling the access information and the framing of information within the Russian Federation. And it's actually interesting. There's different segments of the society that are reacting to it in very different ways. I think your average Russian, they probably know about it, but they're indifferent. We've seen that the Russian state media has tried to focus on the fact of, Hey, we got internally displaced people now, and we have to mobilize volunteers to get food clothing and shelter for these people, that thing. The response has been focused on that, not on the... There's active combat operations happening, and there's reconnaissance groups rolling around with strikers and that thing. Within Russia itself, there's a very interesting debate happening right now about how to use conscripts. By Russian law, conscripts cannot be sent to deploy to foreign countries for expeditionary wars. They can, however, be sent to combat after four months of service. What's been very interesting to see is that when the Ukrainians rolled over into the international border, they ran across the conscripts. There were conscript units there. There were also conscripts that were stationed with the border Guard Service, and the Ukrainians killed and captured a bunch of them.

This is very substantially significant for the Kremlin Because, casualties amongst conscripts is one of the substantial contributing factors that led to the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s due to the mother's movements, concerned mothers about the conscripts that were dying in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, and then the early '90s with the ones that were dying in Chechnya. Putin has got a problem here. And part of Russian society, including the Chechen warlords, they've been arguing that the conscripts must actually be deployed to Kursk because you can't eat Russian bread and collect the paychecks and then not fight to defend the motherland when you're a conscript. But then the mothers and the conscripts have been arguing that they would rather not be deployed to the front here. Right now, the Russian government is indeed setting up a deployment plans to start sending to conscripts from different parts of Russia to the front here. It'll be very interesting to see how Putin is going to juggle this political hot potato with conscripts.

Yeah, agreed. 100 %. Listen, George, if you could stay right there. As you know, the Situation Report. We've got some terrific sponsors. We're going to have to take a quick break. We'll be back with more with George Burrows from the Institute for the Study of War after a quick break here on the PDB Situation Report. Every day, we hear more about surveillance and how our right to privacy is being infringed upon. It's true. It feels like we're living in a world where nothing is truly private anymore. Most of us, and look, frankly, for the sake of convenience, we hand over our personal information without a second thought. We're signing up for services, we're shopping online, or using, of course, social media. But this convenience comes at a cost. It's time for us to take a stand and fight back for our right to privacy. Look, one tool that's been essential for me in this fight is the all-in-one privacy app, and that's MySudo, M-Y-S-U-D-O. Mysudo. It's an app that lets you create multiple digital identities with separate phone numbers and emails so you can keep your personal information private. And in this age of constant surveillance, having MySudo is crucial.

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Com/carlson. That's carshield. Com/carlson. Carshield. Com/carlson. Coverage varies by plan. View contracts and exclusions at carshield. Com. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. Let me bring back my guest, George Buros. He's the Russia team leader at the Institute for the Study of War. George, thanks very much for sticking with us. Let's talk briefly about something that you mentioned at the very beginning of our conversation, and that is that this was not expected, meaning the incursion, the invasion of Russia by the Ukrainian military. Now, it raises all sorts of questions, but one of the things that I'm interested in is to what degree and how good is our intelligence about the Ukrainian military his use of US munitions and weapons during the course of this incursion into the Kursk region?

Yeah, that's a fascinating question. What I'll start with doing is laying out the facts, what we know about what's happened in terms of the tactics and the combat, and then I'll try to answer my current assessment what the US policy is. The facts are that the Ukrainians are using heavy American military equipment on Russian soil. The 82nd Ukrainian Airborne Brigade, they are operating striker combat vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles on Russian territory. That's visually confirmed. We've had M777, 155 millimeter field artillery, been deployed to Khrushchev as well to provide We've got Humvees and a whole bunch of other equipment from other NATO countries as well. We've gotten some confirmed Himars, Gimlars, GMLRS missiles with a range of 75 kilometers. That have been fired across the international border to interdict Russian targets as well. We've got a couple of inflections here in terms of what we've seen before. We've never seen heavy equipment operating on Russian soil. In the past, we had seen Humvees that were being operated by pro-Ukrainian-Russian volunteers, not as part of a large-scale operation, but as tactical raids across the border from last summer. We have seen limited Ukrainian counter battery fire from the high mars across the international border to hit Russian forces that were preparing to attack across the border into Ukraine.

But we've never seen the strikers before, and we've never seen the Ukrainians pull 777s into Russia. In terms of what the current policy is- Do we have- Sure.

Go ahead. I'm sorry. Let me just interrupt you just for a second there, George. I have not seen any, but have we seen any reporting or any insight on the White House's reaction on this particular issue, or even from the Pentagon? Has there been any effort to clamp down? Look, they set the table a little bit. Initially, they were saying, No, you can't use weapons. That went on for almost a couple of years. Then over the past few months, they give them a little bit of free reign, but only in the border area. I'm wondering whether anybody in the US military is pushing back saying, Wait a second, because the whole fear was escalation. The whole fear was this thing just blowing up because of the use of our munitions into Russia. Has that fear just gone away?

I think it's evaporating over time, right? Because where we were back in April of this year, the policy was strictly Unfortunately, the Ukrainians cannot use any American-provided weapons, including just fuel artillery across the international border, full stop. One exception was maybe they could interdict aircraft if they were getting close and a Patriot missile could take them out. That would be okay. But it was very strict. What changed the policy was what happened on May 10. On May 10, the Russians began the renewed cross-border invasion into Kharkiv, and it became so obvious how the Russians were exploiting the sanctuary that our policy had de facto created because they were setting up their command posts and their assembly areas. Only after they rolled across the part of the field that's demarked as the international border, that's when the Ukrainians could interdict them, which was stupid. The policies have since shifted because it became intellectually indefensible. Then now where we're currently at in terms of the policy debate is we've witnessed all the counter factual evidence that you can indeed conduct conventional combat operations with American-provided equipment with the Ukrainians on Russian soil. You can kill them, you can blow them up, you can do a variety of tactical tasks.

It is not the vertical escalation that we're all concerned about into nuclear war and weapons of mass destruction. It is horizontal escalation, a continuation of more intense conventional warfare. That's what we've been arguing this whole time. Currently, the debate is about, can the Ukrainians use long-range precision fires with the Atakums missiles to interdict high-value targets and logistics nodes in the deep rear? Currently, the administration policy has not loosened on that at all. I would argue that in order to create a serious strategy for how the Ukrainians are to actually be successful in defending themselves, we have to remove all the safety nets and all of the little stops that prevent the Ukrainians from building momentum against the Russians. Frankly, there's a lot of really good targets that the Ukrainians could strike if they had rules of engagement permissions to hit those targets with the attack on those missiles.

But what's the downside to that?

Well, the downside is that it comes with more risk because you're hitting more sensitive targets in the rear. By that, I mean command posts, depots that are difficult to protect. You're getting closer to the risky things that the Russians don't want to happen. But I would argue that the risks are actually quite minimal. What's going to happen is the Russians are going to get mad, they're going to say, You crossed the red lines. But there's very little, I think, concretely that Putin can actually do to further escalate this war that he has not already done. They're fully invested in this, and this is where they're at. I would argue that deterrence theory, the same logic that kept us all safe during the Cold War, it's still fundamentally valid. We have nukes, too. Firing those missiles deeper into Russia will actually do a lot of good for the Ukrainians as well. If you look at the map, and we published maps of this, if you look and see the area that the Ukrainians are able to strike with the Atakims missiles, and you map all of the... Just from open source intelligence, the 250 known military targets and installations, many of which cannot be moved, that fall in that range, it requires the Russians to have to protect a 300,000 more kilometers worth of stuff.

As we know with this cross-border invasion, they've had the luxury of not having to protect anything in their deep rear, aside from weak little Ukrainian drones with relatively limited payloads. If we indeed open up this vast, large deep rear area, it will compel a decision point on the Russian military. Is it going to be, do we redeploy our relatively few high-end electronic warfare assets and our high-end air defense assets, which are currently bunched up in the front in Ukraine in order to protect those forward most operating areas? Or if this When stuff in the rear comes under risk, do we actually start redeploying that stuff, pulling it out of the front, sending it to the back to then protect the vulnerable back? I would argue that if they don't make a decision and they say, Okay, we're going to keep it in the front, congrats. You get free hits in the back and you can take their out their tail. If they do argue that we're going to protect the back at the expense of the front, congrats. You have a softer front and the likes of which of doing a penetration battle that the Ukraine has failed in last year become easier to do.

If they make the You mentioned- You mentioned- Oh, sorry. Go ahead. I'm sorry, George. You mentioned deterrence. In the back of people's minds, typically, the concern is always, does something force or push Putin into making what obviously is an irrational decision, but it could happen to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response because he then would argue that he feels as if the very existence of of the motherland is at risk. I mean, that's how he would posture it.

Yeah, I think the risk is very low because look, there's a tremendous amount of counter factual evidence that shows that the Ukrainians are there. The Russians decided not to dignify it as a military operation. It's a counterterrorist operation that the FSB are going to do. When the Ukrainians broke the seal on firing Himar's Gimler's missiles into Russia back in May, that was a big red line that had been crossed. And The Kremlin watchers, look at the tea leaves, were looking very closely at the Kremlin response. Putin gave a speech in June in which he said that the military operations that the Ukrainians are doing now with the American-provided weapons, that those do not reach substantial threshold that would require the use of nuclear weapons. So Putin gave the green light. Then he continues to give the green light now. I really hope that the policymakers look at all the counter factual evidence that indicates that you can conduct a suite of military activities with American-provided weapons against the Russian military in Ukraine and in Russia, and it doesn't result with that escalation that we all want to avoid. By the way, Putin dropping a nuke doesn't solve any of his problems.

It doesn't fix his command and control problems. It doesn't fix his labor shortage in GDP and inflation. It doesn't fix his military's inability to restore operational maneuver, to actually be able to move on the ground. It doesn't fix his force generation problem. It doesn't do a lot for him. I really think it's not likely.

It's interesting because that would posit that he makes decisions because he's on the logic train and you could push back, I suppose, and say, Well, look, there was no real logic in his decision to engage in this adventurism going back to February 2022. But that's a study in psychology. We probably won't get into that just yet. But if If we could look just for a moment at the logistics of all of this. Do you view their incursion into Kershk, in a sense, as a one-off? Do you view it as a legitimate effort to seize and hold Russian territory for whatever reason, to inflict pain on Putin, to disrupt the Russian psyche and create unrest, maybe to use as a leverage for negotiations. Let's talk about that just for a minute because there's this whole It's an issue of, look, you're spreading limited resources now, and you've got to keep supplying, so you got to keep your supply lines open. The idea that you're going to keep pushing out beyond whatever it may be, 500 square miles of territory that they currently hold, what do you view this as in terms of, is it short term?

Is it medium term? Is it a negotiating tool? Run with it wherever you want to.

Yeah, absolutely. I think it can advance multiple lines of effort, and I think the Ukraines are keeping it vague deliberately. What it does do is I think it's not a means into an end by itself. What it is doing is it's forcing the Russians to think about their resource allocation throughout the theater. I think it's designed in part to help create some opportunities for where the Ukrainians might be able to conduct offensive operations in the near future or other tactical counterattacks of convenience in the near future. Right now, by the Russian zone reporting, they are reporting, and I have no way to verify this because we don't collect on friendly forces, but that the Ukrainians are assembling forces in the south, where the Russians are currently pulling forces away to go respond to Khrushchev. We also, yesterday, had a Ukrainian brigade officially announced that they're beginning offensive operations in neighboring Kharkiv Oblast, slightly to the east of Kursk. What we see now is the Russians moving stuff, the Ukrainians seeming to set themselves up for other things, and the Ukrainians, they achieve operational surprise with this campaign, I think that they're setting themselves up to be able to achieve some operational surprise of future supporting operations in the future.

The Soviets, in their doctrine, they call this the operational art. It's the idea that you use small supporting campaigns, you link them together in space-time so that one undertaking sets the ground for the next one, which sets the ground for the next one, which sets the ground for the next one, so that if you're skillful with your operational and campaign design, you get to such a place where your adversary is perpetually on the backfoot. They never really recover from losing the initiative. That's actually one of the key cornerstones of Soviet operational art that Ukrainians are students of. I think that's what we're talking about.

Where does this go? I'm sorry, George, I We're going to be mindful of our time. You can count on the fact we're going to be calling you again. We're going to put your number on speed dial because there's a lot more to discuss here. But is there any sense that That part of this, though, is we want turf and POWs, look, they've captured a significant number of Russian soldiers, to force Putin's hand to get them to the negotiating table?

Yeah. I think the Ukrainians are trying to stave off negotiations right now because they know that any negotiations are not going to be worth the paper they're written on, that the current front lines are not a stable equilibrium, and that the Russians will be able to resume this at a place in time of their choosing, just as Putin began the 2022 war on the basis of a 2015 ceasefire deal that was inked out by the powers that be then. So I think the Ukraine are trying to stave off negotiations, But I think the territory that they currently hold and seize can indeed be used as a bartering ship to improve their negotiating position. But I actually, I don't think that's the means to the end. That's one of the pluses of it. With regards to holding it indefinitely, I don't think the Ukrainians want to hold it indefinitely. They say they don't, and I personally buy that, but it's a good ship to have in the back pocket.

Yeah. Well, George, I can tell you something. This has been fascinating. I've got a ton more questions. Like I said, we will be pestering you again to rejoin us here. But George Barrows from the Institute for the Study of War. Thank you again for joining us. It's always appreciated, and we look forward to the next time.

Thanks for having me, Mike. Really appreciate it.

All right. Well, up next, we're shifting our focus to the war's impact beyond the battlefield. We're still in Russia. We're still dealing with the conflict, but we're looking at it beyond the battlefield, including the economic and social turmoil inside Russia. Joining us to discuss this is Konstantin Smoylyov, a Russian expat and commentator who provides a unique insider's perspective on the situation from his popular YouTube channel, which is called Inside Russia. I highly recommend you check it out. Hey, are you overwhelmed with back taxes and unfiled returns? I hope not, but if you are, listen up. With 88,000 newly hired agents, can you imagine that? 88,000 newly hired agents, the IRS has increased enforcement, issuing millions of what they call Pay Up Notices in 2024. How pleasant does that sound? It's a beautiful day. You walk out to your mailbox, you open up your mailbox, and there you've got a Pay Up Notice from the IRS. Good God. Don't face IRS collection tactics alone. Tax Network USA can help. As the nation's premier tax relief firm, they have negotiated over $1 billion, that's $1 billion with a B, in tax relief for clients. Services include penalty forgiveness, hardship programs, and offer and compromise solutions.

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That's affecting millions who are grappling with the consequences of a war that, at least for now, shows no sign of ending anytime soon. Now, for more on that, I'm joined by a very special guest, Konstantin Semalow, a Russian expat who left his country in the fall of 2022. Shortly after the government's military mobilization, he now runs the popular YouTube channel Inside Russia. I highly recommend you check that out, where he offers insightful commentary on the current situation within Russia. Konstantin, thank you very much for joining us here on the Situation Report.

I really appreciate it. Mike, thank you for having me. It's a pleasure and honor being here.

Well, after you talk to me for a little while, you'll think differently about that. But let's get right into our conversation. Look, let's start from the top in terms of a 30,000-foot view. This is going to be a very general, very simple question, but I want you to go with it wherever you want. What is the current mood of the Russian population when it comes to this conflict with Ukraine?

We're talking about right now in late August of '24, after Ukrainians rolled into Russian territory. I can't really call it invasion. I call it the special military operation that Ukraine is conducting on Russian soil. Once that started What's happening? Russians have started waking up and getting angry. This is the sense that this is the feeling that I'm getting in Russia.

I guess when it comes to dissemination of information. Look, I'd argue that here in the US, we all have way too much access to immediate information and opinion, and everyone's become a journalist. Obviously, if we look at the incursion into Kursk as an For example, depending on who you talk to, maybe a couple of hundred thousand people have been evacuated from the area, so clearly they know about it. But the people in Moscow, for instance, in other parts of Russia, are they aware of the extent of this incursion into Russian territory by the Ukrainian military?

First of all, there are two Russians, not one. One Russia is Moscow and Saint Petersburg, and the second Russia is the rest of Russia. If we're talking about Moscow and Saint Petersburg, life is well there. People still have jobs. People, their lives are peaceful. They are doing well compared to the rest of Russia. There's not much of a difference after the Ukrainians rolled in. Perhaps there is, but not as visible as in the rest of Russia, because in the rest of Russia, especially in the Western part of Russia, the central Russia, people all of a sudden realized that something that is very majorly wrong is happening. And the government isn't doing much about it. They're just keeping quiet. But like you said, a couple of hundred thousand people have been displaced. More than that. Official information is 121,000, but I never trust Russian officials. At least double that, perhaps triple that. People are running, running, running, and they're screaming. They're very loud, and you You can't really silence them. You can't sugarcoat them. They're becoming... This information is becoming more widespread, and it's definitely given a lot of food for thought of Russians. I would say that this is the new stage in the history of Russia.

The Russian people have started waking up, or at least started thinking and asking questions. What the heck is going on?

Is there a sense Is there a sense of fatigue among the general population over this conflict, or is there a sense of resignation? Look, this is going to happen. We can't influence it, so we just need to worry about our own selves and putting food on the table and taking care of the kids, that thing. I guess the big question that I'm trying to get to here is, is there a concern by Putin that he could be losing the population in terms of popular opinion?

There is fatigue, definitely, and it's growing. It just increased its speed. As for Putin, I don't really think he cares about Russian population. He has absolutely different goals. And he has different means of reaching goals. And population is definitely not his concern. I think he's much more concerned of macroeconomics problems, macroeconomies economic problems that Russia is facing right now with Turkey, China, and the US sanctions, increasing US sanctions. And he's very, I think, that's my opinion, he's very afraid of political fight inside the elites that someone will be trying to take on him, on his power, to topple him.

How effective, in your opinion, are the sanctions at this point on the economy? What impact are they actually having on people's everyday lives inside Russia?

How do I say that? They've had a very slow start. Of course, lots of sanctions. Russia became the most sanctioned country in the history of humankind in 2022. Tons of questions were... Tons of sanctions were placed. All kinds of sanctions, economic, athletics, cultural, scientific. I think that a lot of them were not effective. But two years later, the United States started taking it seriously. And in the last six months, say a little more, eight months, we're seeing the effects. The secondary sanctions are right now the silent killer of Russia in its economy, and everyone in Russia starts feeling them. I'm just going to give you two examples. Well, three examples, really. It's like show cases. First of all, Russian oil trade is declining, and that is breadmaking of Russia. I'm not talking about natural gas. It's almost shut down. But oil, that's what has been keeping Russian economy alive for all this two and a half years. Number two, the international trade, the trade with Turkey has shut down completely. After the US Secretary of State, Blinking, visited Turkish banks, Turkish business elites, and warned them that if they keep on doing business with Russians, then they might fall victims as well.

And that's it. They just shot off Russia off their... You can't transfer money to Turkey. Therefore, you cannot buy anything from Turkey. And the Chinese started doing the same only a few weeks later, mid-February. And these three things are really putting tremendous, I can't even say stress, tremendous damage to the economy. So they're working. They were laid Great, but they started working pretty darn well.

I think your comment about China is interesting because I think the general perception, at least in the West, is that, if anything, the relationship between China and Russia has strengthened, and that to some degree, the reason why Putin can continue his adventurism in Ukraine is because the Chinese regime has helped the Russian economy. From your perspective, is that not the case?

Mike, using this chance being seen by many people in the USA, in the West, I have a bone to pick with the Western media. I know that a lot of people have been saying, Hey, the relationship between China and Russia is strengthening because of this situation, this war with Ukraine and sanctions. But have they done any research? Have they looked at the situation a little a little deeper. I don't think so, because this is just on the very surface. It's wishful thinking for Russia. That's the image Russia has been portraying and projecting everywhere. Oh, we're friends with China more. We're allies. We have a military pact, military document, military union. We conduct military exercises together, joint exercises. Oh, the Chinese are buying our natural gas, and we're going to build another pipeline. We're going to double what we sell them, export our gas, and they're going to bail us out. They're going to give us all the technology. That's the Russian, not point of view, propaganda projection. In reality, China hasn't done much at all. The only thing it's been doing is producing consumer goods and exporting to Russia, but that's to the benefit of China.

Not to Russia. There are mercenaries- That's a really good...

Actually, that's a... I'm sorry, Konstantin, for interrupting, but that's a really good point because, look, frankly, the Chinese regime always acts in its own best interest. To be fair, that's what most nations do.

China just does it dead. Always. They don't have friends. You see, Putin is trying to say, China is our friend. Chinese do not have friends. They have interests. That's what Russians fail to understand, because this myth is alive in Russia as well. Russian people also think that since the West has turned away from Russia, Russia has turned away from the West, the China is right there waiting with arms wide open. But no, there are rumors that they supplied some military products, drones or technology, but I highly doubt that. Because you know what happens? The minute someone finds a Chinese drone in Ukraine, shot down, and gives it as a proof, China's going to have it in forms of sanctions. Why would they risk everything supply? Iran has been supply, yes, but not China. The last hope, Putin and the other- I I think they have been- About China?

I'm sorry for interrupting constantly. I'm just mindful of the time. I want to pick that conversation up again, what you just said, talking about what if they found Chinese munitions on the battlefield. But first, if you'll just stay with us for a moment, We have to take a quick break, and then we'll be right back. Hey, Mike Baker here. If you're tired of the same old coffee from those mega corporations pushing their woke agendas, well, listen up. It's time to take a stand and support a brand that truly embodies American values. Here, I'm talking about Blackout Coffee. Look at that, Blackout Coffee. They stand with hardworking Americans who believe in family, faith, freedom, the same things you believe in. They roast some of the most incredible coffee you'll ever taste using only premium-grade beans, wasted and shipped to you, get this, within 48 hours. The beans are in the roaster, then they're in a package, then they're on your porch, and they're in your mug, right? That's amazing. For the cold brew fans, Blackout Coffee is now also excited to announce the launch of their two new ready to drink cold brew coffee latte options.

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It's a core asset that you might want to consider holding on to. Well, call the proud Americans of the Patriot Gold Group today. Before it's too late, mention PDB, and you will always get best-in-class service from Patriots Protecting Patriots. Now, Patriot Gold Group has the No Fee for Life IRA, where your IRA or 401k can be in physical gold and silver, and you may be eligible for the No fee for life IRA on qualifying rollovers. Call 1-888-870-5457 for a free investor guide. Patriot Gold Group is consumer affairs top-rated gold IRA dealer for seven years in a row. That's a lot of years in a row. Call 1-888-870-5457. Welcome back to the PDB Situation Report. I want to bring back our guest, Konstantin Samalow. He is the host of the terrific YouTube channel Inside Russia. Now, Konstantin, when we took a break, we were talking about something very interesting, which is this relationship between China and Russia. And there is a disconnect between how it's being reported in the West and what you've been describing in Western media, and certainly in the White House and in other, I think, governments. They are looking at this as if the conflict with Ukraine has, over the past for a couple of years, brought Russia and China together, and that China, in a sense, has been supporting the Russian war machine, mostly through economic reasons, purchasing of energy, that thing.

From your perspective, that's not the case. Do you get the sense that China acts in its own best interest. It does what is in China's best interest. Right now, I suspect they view it in their best interest to have at least some association in some relationship with Russia that continues Putin's efforts. Tell me if I'm wrong, but I think they have been providing a fair amount of economic support.

I disagree. They have been providing lots of things that Russia doesn't manufacture, but they haven't been providing. They have been exporting, selling to Russia. Russians have been trying to get a large loan from China. They have failed. Russians have been trying to sell lots of oil and natural gas to China. They have succeeded at selling, but they have failed at negotiating good prices. They were selling natural gas and oil to Europe, its best customer in the past. But that's not the case with China. The Chinese have a stronger negotiation position. Russia has nowhere to go except for China. So they're not paying much for Russian oil and gas. And the last nail into Russia's coffin, so to speak, is recently happened a couple of days ago. Vladimir Putin was betting everything on constructing this new, expanding this gas pipeline, Syla Sibiri 2, the power of Siberia, to reroute that natural gas from Europe into China, but he has failed. The Chinese announced a couple of days ago that this is it. They're not going to do it. And I think that's a huge blow to Putin, personally, and it's a huge blow to his power, his foundation of his power.

And that's a huge blow for Russia because Russia has lost. You see, Putin is going down, but he's taking Russia with him. He's going to be gone sooner or later. But Russia will stay, and it's going to be going down, and it's going to stay down. That is the tragedy.

Let's turn back to the Russian population inside the country, and let's look at the issue of manpower for the conflict. In terms of conscripts, in terms of the potential for another mobilization, talk to me about that a little bit. Talk about the of the people inside of Russia and their willingness to sign up to join the military. Is morale high or is it more that people are just looking to try to avoid this situation altogether?

Mike, this is something that I can only guess and get the secondary signs because I have not been to the front lines. I have not seen what's going on there. I'm I've been hearing lots of things from different sources. In the front lines, the morale is extremely low. Russia is its worst. Corruption, they don't care about the soldiers, all these things. They don't provide soldiers with anything. There are so many sources I've heard to ignore, so that must be true or some truth in there. What about the population? Basically, they have been buying soldiers for the past two years, and it's a very sad thing. I'm very ashamed as a Russian, because a lot of my fellow citizens signed up voluntarily and went to the front lines for money. You could see the supply diminishing very easily by judging how much they have been offering. They've been increasing the sign-up bonuses. It all started with, I believe 200,000 federal. The federal government would pay you $2,000 and around $1,000 from the local government. Now the federal government is paying double what it used to, $4,000. And the local governments, different amounts, but it's as much as $20,000.

They keep on raising the sign-up bonuses. It means they have fewer and fewer people. That's pure economics. And it just tells you about the situation. This is it. Everyone who wanted to go, they're done. They're all gone. Then don't forget about those who were killed at the front lines and those who have left, just like myself. Over 3 million people have left since the beginning of the war, refusing to take arms, go kill Ukrainians, and refusing just to go along with Putin's regime, paying taxes and so forth. We go back to the question about fatigue. People are very tired of this. They want peace. They want normal life. Well, unfortunately, it's a little too late. Even when peace is reached, there's no way of going back to normal life for Russia and Russians.

The numbers, the statistics for casualties, fatalities, have been all over the map, on both sides. You just hear there's such a discrepancy between one set of numbers, we've lost this many people, and on the other side as well. From your contacts, from your insight, on the Russian side, what do you think is the best, closest estimate to the number of fatalities that the Russian military suffered?

Mike, you put me on the spot. I don't know. I think the count is in hundreds of thousands. But I don't know. I just know a lot. A lot of people were killed. I know personally six people who have been killed. Not personally, but neighbors, neighbors, neighbors, friend, and Things like that. I think it's really safe to say that it's hundreds of thousands.

I don't remember. You're in good company.

How many Ukrainians were killed?

I was going to say, Konstantin, again, sorry to interrupt. You're in good company because not a lot of people actually have the actual facts. Again, even talking about Intel community and the EU, our liaison partners, people are confused over what the actual numbers look like. That's just been the history of this ever since the beginning.

You know, an interesting thing here to notice is that Russian officials, Russian propaganda government, they've been quiet about it. They haven't said... Well, they've said Three times. Week number one, week number four, and September 2022, when they announced mobilization. And the numbers were like 5,000, something like that. Which is, of course, it was not true. It was a lie. But they keep ignoring as if nothing is happening. And people are not asking this hugely important question. I don't understand why they This is their sons, husbands, their fathers, and they're just keeping quiet.

Last question, Konstantin, and then I hope you'll come back again because I've got a lot more questions, but just with our time that we have allowed for today, where does this go? How does this end, in your opinion?

There are a few paths. In But it depends, of course, it depends on Russia, because Russia is going to be the driving force in the end. I think that the victory will be Ukraine, and the victory will not come from the front lines, but it will come from inside Russia. I think that the regime that is in the power right now will fall because it's not sustainable. It cannot go on for a long time at this situation. The leadership will be changed. How? I don't know. There are different paths. A peaceful path, Russia would have to to repent. Russians would have to repent because it's really about Russian people. It's not about a strong man. They would have to realize what they have done by silently supporting, by not saying anything, by paying taxes, by voting or not voting. They have to realize it's their responsibility. It's their fault. That's their guilt. They have to repent. They have to somehow find peaceful terms with Ukraine and start rebuilding their country. Or Russia might fall into different pieces. That's also a possibility. That scares a lot of people. Scares me, too. But the more of this is going on, the more clear that scenario is appearing.

There are other scenarios.

Well, Konstantin, listen, this has been fascinating, and I very much appreciate your time. Konstantin Seminow. I want to say thanks very much for joining us. I encourage the viewers, please go check out Konstantin's YouTube channel. It's called Inside Russia. There'll be a link to the channel in the show description to those watching on YouTube or listening on podcast. Konstantin, thanks very much. I hope to see you again here in the near future.

Mike, thank you for having me. It's been a pleasure. I hope to come back, and I'll answer more questions.

We will definitely be calling you. Take care, man. All right. Now, listen, if we had a house banned, well, now would be the time that they'd quietly, just off to the side, be kicking off our theme song. You didn't know we had a theme song, did you? Well, but basically what I'm saying is that's all the time we have for the PDB situation report. If you have any questions or comments, please reach out at pdb@thefirsttv. Com. We love to hear from you. The highlight of the week for our interns, frankly, is when the mailbags full of your letters and postcards get delivered to the PDB compound. We collect a bunch of your questions and comments, and we use them in a monthly episode that we cleverly call Ask Me Anything. As you've no doubt heard, to listen to the podcast of this show, Ad Free, become a premium member of the President's Daily Brief by visiting, and this is so simple, pdbpremium. Com. Told you, simple. Remember, I got a lot to talk about here, don't I? Remember, new episodes of the PDP Situation Report air every Friday at 10:00 PM on the first TV.

Of course, on all podcast platforms, and the juggernaut that is our YouTube channel, at President's Daily Brief. I'm Mike Baker. Until next time, well, you know the drill. Stay informed, stay safe, stay cool.